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The rapid and accelerating development of security economics has generated great 
demand for more and better data to accommodate the empirical research agenda. The 
present paper serves as a guide to policy makers and researchers for security-related 
databases. The paper focuses on two main issues. Firstly, it takes stock of the existing 
databases, highlighting their main components and also performs a brief statistical 
comparison. Secondly, it discusses data shortages and needs that are considered essential 
for enhancing our understanding of the complex phenomenon of terrorism as well as 
designing and evaluating policy.     
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1.   Introduction 
Security Economics is a newly developing discipline that aims at measuring the 
economic impacts of terrorism. Moving to the quantification of these impacts one may 
distinguish between direct and indirect effects that range across a wide spectrum of 
economic actors’ decisions and markets. In general the negative impact of terrorism-
driven insecurity on the economy can be presented in terms of an ‘insecurity tax’. 
Terrorist activity generates various direct costs such as the loss of life and property 
damages, but also the portion of fiscal expenditures directed to counter-terrorism. Among 
terrorism’s indirect costs one may include the reduction in economic activity taking the 
form of lower FDI flows (Enders and Sandler 1996; Abadie and Gardeazabal 2005), 
lower international trade (Nitsch and Schumacher 2004), lower tourism demand (Enders 
and Sandler 1991; Fleischer and Buccola 2002; Pizam and Fleischer 2002; Drakos and 
Kutan 2003;  Llorca-Vivero, 2008), and lower GDP growth (Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2003; Blomberg, et al, 2004). In addition, significant losses have been established in 
stock market capitalization as a consequence of terrorism (Chen and Siems 2004; Carter 
and Simkins 2004; Drakos 2004; Eldor and Melnick 2004; Karolyi and Martell 2005; 
Amélie and Darné 2006; Athanassiou et al, 2006; Gulley and Sultan 2006; Chesney and 
Reshetar 2007). 
The rapid and accelerating development of security economics has generated 
great demand for more and better data in order to accommodate the empirical research 
agenda. The present paper serves as a guide to policy makers and active researchers for 
security-related databases. The paper focuses on two main issues. Firstly, it takes stock of 
the existing databases, highlighting their main components and also performs a brief   3
statistical comparison. Secondly, it discusses data shortages and needs that are considered 
essential for enhancing our understanding of the complex phenomenon of terrorism, as 
well as, designing and evaluating counterterrorism policy.  
There have been two previous papers dealing with the issue of terrorism 
databases. Fowler (1981) presented a comparison of existing, at the time, databases 
paying special attention to their scope and content and the systems used for data retrieval. 
More recently Schmid (2004) offered an up to date review of existing terrorism databases 
and also explored various issues by performing statistical analysis. A major advantage of 
Schmid’s study is the in depth analysis of the several drawbacks of databases.  
The present study could be seen as a natural descendant of this line of papers. 
However I have made an attempt not to replicate or revisit their main parts. The value 
added of this study is twofold. First, apart from the comparison of existing databases on 
terrorism, it extends the information sources to other databases traditionally not employed 
in terrorism research. Second, and perhaps more important, it provides a critical 
assessment of what data is needed from the point of view of the applied researcher.      
2. Required  Qualitative  and  Quantitative Properties of 
Datasets 
   Before I proceed to a description of the available terrorism databases it would be 
fruitful to give a background discussion regarding the required properties of datasets from 
the viewpoint of an applied researcher. The applied researcher conducts econometric / 
statistical analysis based on available data for three main purposes: (i) explain the past, 
(ii) predict the future, and (iii) provide policy advice. Given these three main purposes, 
one identifies the following properties that a database should possess: 
   4
•  Relevance and transparency of definition: the working definition of terrorism 
should reflect a scientific view of what - and what does not - constitute terrorism 
activity, rather than represent contextual and politically-driven motives. In addition, 
the definition should be transparent, minimizing the scope for ambiguities and / or 
borderline cases. However, the definition should be broad and flexible enough to 
accommodate the potential emergence of new types of terrorism in the future.              
•  Spatial and intertemporal consistency: the adopted definition used in the collection 
of data must be consistent both over time and across regions. The intertemporal 
stability is essential to allow a meaningful time series analysis of the terrorism 
process and its effects. Furthermore, the delicate transition from comprehending the 
past to predicting the future depends crucially on the intertemporal stability of 
definition. Similarly, the definition of terrorism must be consistent across regions. 
From an econometric point of view this consistency is required in order to allow 
cross-country analysis. The spatial and intertemporal consistency is essential for 
arriving at meaningful comparisons on various dimensions such as terrorism hazard, 
terrorism consequences, and counterterrorism effectiveness.              
•  Operational and exhaustive reporting: the reporting of terrorism data must be 
operational in order to accommodate the econometric analysis. In particular, one 
identifies two elements for which operationalization is important. Firstly, in several 
cases the level of disaggregation must be fine enough (for instance at a regional or 
micro level). Secondly, when possible, providing direct numeric measurement (for 
instance terrorism’s direct consequences, agents’ willingness to pay to avoid the risk 
of terrorism). Furthermore, any dataset must be exhaustive both cross-nationally and   5
intertemporally (i.e covering all years and all countries). Moreover, the coding of a 
terrorism incident must incorporate, when possible, all important incident attributes 
(i.e. types of attack, weapons used, type of target, perpetrator, number and 
nationalities of terrorists involved, number and nationalities of victims, number of 
casualties, property damages, etc).    
3.   Existing databases 
A distinctive feature of terrorism data is the lack of a unique and comprehensive 
database. The non-uniqueness is partly explained by the fact that social scientists 
(primarily political scientists) have treated domestic and transnational terrorism as 
separate processes, leading to the compilation of different databases. In addition, the 
absence of a centralized body dealing with terrorism also led to the establishment of 
independent databases where in some cases they reflect the collector’s interests.    
The non-comprehensiveness of databases reflects the complexity of the terrorism 
phenomenon per se and also the multitude of sources from which data are collected 
(usually open sources such as the media and in some cases local police reports). The 
occurrence of a typical terrorist incident offers limited information that can be directly 
coded in databases. For instance, the two most obvious and undisputable attributes of any 
event are the location (country, city / town) and the timing (day / month / year). For all 
other related, but essential for research, aspects there is usually some degree of 
uncertainty. Starting with the observable attributes of terrorist events, the type of attack 
is relatively easier to establish (bombing, kidnapping, arson etc.), while human 
casualties (dead and wounded) are not always reported with precision, a problem that is 
even more pronounced for property damages. Attributes related to the actual   6
perpetrators are even harder to pin down. In particular, given that in the vast majority of 
cases terrorists flee the scene or die at the scene, it is rather difficult to ascertain which 
terrorist organization carried out the attack, who the exact target was and what was the 
aim of the attack. For most cases that such information is available, the source is the 
terrorists themselves who claim responsibility and usually provide partial answers 
regarding the target, their motives and aims. Note however that for a sizeable portion of 
terrorist incidents there is no claim of responsibility or in fewer cases there are multiple 
(and sometimes competing) claims of responsibility. In addition, the logistical effort of 
terrorists is usually not known, i.e we do not have information regarding the number of 
terrorists that were involved, the weapons deployed, let alone issues such as the time 
and resources devoted for planning the attack. 
3.1 Main terrorism databases: terrorism definition and 
available related variables    
  The main terrorism databases that basically correspond to chronologies of terrorist 
events are:  
1.  International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) 
2.  Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED)  
3.  Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
4.  World Incident Tracking System (WITS) 
5.  Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)  
6.  RAND database.  
The last two have merged and access to the dataset at the time this paper was written was 
not possible, while the WITS database covers the post 2004 period. Therefore in what 
follows I will discuss the other three databases.     7
  One of the oldest and most widely used databases is ITERATE covering the period 
1968-2007, which focuses on transnational terrorism and was developed by Edward 
Mickolus, Todd Sandler, Jean Murdock and Peter Flemming (2007). The working 
definition of international/transnational terrorism used by the ITERATE is:  
“… the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by 
any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental 
authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group 
wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its 
perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its 
resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries.  International terrorism is such 
action when carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state, whereas 
transnational terrorism is carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not 
they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states. "Victims" are those individuals who 
are directly harmed by the terrorist incident.  While a given terrorist action may somehow harm 
world stability, citizens of nations must feel a more direct loss than the weakening of such a 
collective good”. 
  
Jan Engene developed Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED), a database 
covering terrorism events in 18 countries in Western Europe for the time period 1950 to 
2004. The TWEED data set only includes events initiated by agents originating in the 
West European countries and therefore transnational terrorism is not considered (see 
Engene 2006). The TWEED dataset is based on a single news source: Keesing’s Record 
of World Events (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives). The working definition is:  
 
“As an act of terrorism is counted an act that has inflicted personal injury, or attacks against 
material targets (property) if the act is of a nature that could have led to personal injury or in 
another way would have a noticeable impact on an audience, while at the same time the act was 
committed to direct demands of or raise attention from others than those immediately inflicted 
with personal or material injury. On the basis of the form of the entries and the information 
available in Keesing’s the operational definition in section 3 is used. 3. The following events are 
counted as violent actions of a terrorist nature: Bombings, explosions, arson, fires, rocket 
attacks, killings, attempted killings, abductions, kidnaps, shootings, sieges, violent actions, 
violent attacks, attacks and similar violent actions. The event must be brought about by an agent 
that has deliberately initiated the action”. 
  
  The most recent database is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) developed by 
Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan at the University of Maryland, containing both domestic   8
and international incidents. The database consists of two distinct parts; (GTD1) it records 
worldwide events for the period 1970 to 1997
1 and (GTD2) for the period 1998 to 2004 
(see LaFree and Dugan 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). The working definitions are as follows:  
(GTD1). “In order to be considered a "terrorist incident" the event had to have been committed 
by nonstate actors, had to have been violent, and intentional. In addition the act must have met 
two of the following three criteria: (1) The act must have been aimed at attaining a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit did 
not satisfy this criterion. (2) There must have been evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, 
or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. 
(3) The action must have been outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must 
have been outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or noncombatants)”. 
 
(GTD 2). “Throughout the data collection period PGIS employed a broad definition of terrorism: 
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. 
 
Table 1 reports the main variables offered in the three databases are presented in Tables 
1
2.   
----------Table 1---------- 
3.2 Relationship  between  Databases: A Statistical Overview 
  A direct comparison of the three databases is not possible for two reasons. Firstly, 
the GTD includes both domestic and transnational incidents while ITERATE and TWEED 
include only transnational and domestic incidents respectively. Hence I proceed with a 
merging (essentially ‘adding’ events) of ITERATE and TWEED by year and country in 
order to accommodate a comparison with GTD. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, 
the databases do not employ an identical definition of terrorist activity. Thus, if not 
anything else, the comparison will highlight any differences attributed to the diversity of 
definitions. Another cautionary note is in order, since according to the user guide the 
                                                 
1 Data for 1993 are not available 
2 The interested researcher should check the availability on a variable basis since for a substantial number 
of them data are missing.      9
GTD2 database should neither be merged nor compared to GTD1 because the data were 
collected using different methods and often different data definitions. Despite this I treat 
GTD as a homogeneous dataset since the main analysis that will follow does not look into 
the dynamics of terrorism but rather compares different databases.        
3.2.1  Overall time series trajectories  
Graph 1 depicts the time series paths of total terrorist incidents in 15 European 
countries for the databases
3.     
----------Graph 1---------- 
Inspection of the time plots reveals a clear disparity between the two databases in 
terms of the total number of terrorist attacks reported by year. Moreover, the disparity is 
not consistently moving in one direction. i.e  GTD always higher (lower) than the 
combined  TWEED  and  ITERATE. However for the majority of years GTD reports a 
higher number of incidents. Graph 2 shows the ratio of total terrorist incidents reported in 
the two datasets.    
----------Graph 2---------- 
If the two sources provided similar information their ratio would be close to 100, 
a property that clearly is not satisfied. In fact the average value of their ratio is 128 % 
ranging between 17.5 % to 374 %. On the other hand, irrespectively of which data source 
is chosen, a clear decrease in the overall number of incidents on an annual basis is 
apparent. The visual evidence for a drop in total incidents is statistically supported by a 
simple regression of each database’s attacks on a linear time trend. Graph 3 depicts the 
relevant findings.  
                                                 
3 Attacks in Northern Ireland and Corsica have been added in UK and France respectively.       10
----------Graph 3---------- 
Table 2 summarizes the estimates from the above mentioned regressions.  
----------Table 2---------- 
Again dissimilarities are apparent in terms of the rate of decrease in terrorist 
attacks, since for GTD, I document that terrorist attacks have been decreasing by an 
average of 10 attacks per year while for the combined ITERATE-TWEED the 
corresponding drop is about 17 attacks per year.  
3.2.2 Similarity  of  Databases  Information: Country and Time 
Correlations   
Table 3 reports the terrorist incidents by country that the two data sources include.  
----------Table 3---------- 
Again if the two sources provided similar information their ratio would be close 
to 100. On average the actual ratio is 104 with a standard deviation of 70, ranging from a 
minimum of 41 (for the case of Portugal) to a maximum of 251 (for the case of Italy).  
To further investigate the relationship of the two data sources I provide the 
sample correlation coefficients between the joint TWEED and ITERATE data with data 
from GTD by country.  Graph 4 depicts the correlation coefficients from this exercise. 
The similarity of databases differs markedly depending on the country, ranging from 0.82 
(Belgium) to 0.04 % (for Netherlands). This implies that even though it appears that the 
two data sources provide in certain cases similar overall information this masks the fact 
that for a given country the distributions of included incidents across time differ 
substantially. The average correlation on a country level is 0.4191.        
 ----------Graph 4----------   11
The cross-sectional relationship of databases, i.e. ‘holding time constant’ and 
allowing variation across countries is captured by the correlation coefficients by year. 
Graph 5 shows the sample correlation coefficients. Again the similarity of databases 
varies substantially depending on the year, ranging from 0.27 (in 1982) to 0.99 (in 1974), 
while the correlation is 0.69 on average.      
----------Graph 5---------- 
3.2.3 Longitudinal  (Time series-country level) 
So far the analysis has focused on the comparison of databases on certain 
dimensions and now turns to a holistic view where I focus on the panel dimension 
considering cross-sectional (across countries) and time series (across years) variations 
simultaneously.   
----------Table 4---------- 
The overall coefficient of determination of the model is only 20 % and this is 
decomposed into about 6 % explanatory power for the within variation and about 76 % 
for the between variation. These results simply verify and, of course mirror, the findings 
from the previous analysis. Thus it becomes apparent from the comparison of databases 
that they provide a better picture regarding differences between countries but when it 
comes to variation across time on a country basis (within country) they offer quite 
different information.   
3.3 Information  included in other sources 
The vast majority of academic research has relied on data from chronologies such 
as the ones described earlier. In the following section I would like to bring to the   12
researchers’ attention data, and other general information, located in alternative sources 
that could be used in applied work to complement data from chronologies.     
3.3.1  Europol reports  
Since 2007 the Europol publishes an annual report entitled Terrorism Situation 
and Trend Report (TESAT) for member states, covering a number of aspects that could 
potentially be useful for academic research. The data appearing in TESAT cover arrests, 
prosecutions and convictions in the EU for terrorist offences. Table 5 provides a 
detailed list of the variety of quantitative data that appear in the TESAT reports by year. 
 ----------Table 5---------- 
The value added of the TESAT reports is that they provide information for some 
dimensions of authorities’ counterterrorism performance that as a rule do not appear in 
chronologies, and could be a useful complement for research. The main disadvantages of 
TESAT are its short time span and also the aggregate nature of the data that do not lend 
themselves to a deeper statistical analysis. Nevertheless collection of this sort of data, and 
especially in a centralized manner, could be of utmost importance.  
3.3.2  Survey Data: Eurobarometer  
Two uses of terrorism data have attracted considerable attention in the empirical 
literature. The first relates to the exact date that an incident took place and then 
attempting to identify whether there were significant adverse economic impacts on that 
day or for a short period after the attack occurrence. Typical applications focus on the 
potential effects on capital markets. The second, instead of relying on the exact incident 
date, it rather aggregates incidents over a given interval (month, quarter, year) in order to   13
construct a measure of terrorist activity intensity and then proceed with the measurement 
of potential negative impacts on various dimensions of economic activity.   
Another possibility, perhaps of equal value from a research point of view, could 
be to investigate the terrorism’s and/or organized crime’s indirect effects in the form of 
causing a change in agents’ (households, firms, etc.) economic behavior. Thus, if data 
regarding the perception of insecurity risk or insecurity-driven uncertainty were available 
they could provide significant value added to research.  
To this end a database that could in principle be proved indispensable, namely the 
Eurobarometer which is a micro-level survey focusing on individuals, falls short of one’s 
expectations. For instance, the Eurobarometer questionnaires only started to include 
questions related to terrorism in 2002. Moreover, the actual number of questions is 
extremely small (ranging from 1 to 6 questions, depending on the issue-year). However, a 
closer inspection of the questionnaires reveals a further drawback, since some of the 
questions do not appear continuously in all issues, while for other questions one finds 
similar phrasing but not identical in subsequent surveys. In table 6 I take stock of the 
terrorism-related questions also indicating the issue in which they appear. As it turns out 
the only questions that have a relatively longer record of inclusion are questions 
regarding to (i) whether the fight against terrorism should be an EU policy priority, 
(ii) whether individuals perceive terrorism as one of the most important problems 
their country is facing, (iii) whether decision making regarding the fight against 
terrorism should be done at the national or EU level and to a lesser extent and (iv) 
whether the EU has played a positive or not role in the fight against terrorism.                     
----------Table 6----------   14
4.  (In-) Security data needs and proposals for 
collection mechanisms  
The non-canonical nature of security related data and the diverse goals of final 
users make the actual collection of data, and the subsequent compilation of databases, a 
very challenging task. As it has become apparent from the previous sections the only 
systematic data collection process so far has been in the form of terrorist events 
chronologies that suffer from their fundamental collection criterion, which is the 
occurrence of an event. Hence databases are either heavily lopsided towards including 
event-driven information, or ignore altogether other equally important aspects of the 
terrorism generation process that go beyond a single event’s attributes and profile.  
In addition, chronologies are primarily, if not exclusively, based on open public 
sources such as the media. This open-source dependency masks a number of lurking risks 
that greatly affect the coverage and quality of data. Firstly, the well-know statistical 
problem of reporting bias cannot be fully avoided especially in non-democratic countries 
where the media are either controlled or in some degree censored (Drakos and Gofas 
2006; 2007; Drakos 2007). Secondly, the media might cover terrorist attacks provided 
that they pass a certain scale, and as a result it is plausible that some terrorist activity has 
gone undetected (Rohner and Frey 2007). Thirdly, the media report information that is 
readily available and only directly linked to the incident. Finally, chronologies by simply 
tracing observed terrorist activity do not provide information for more general and event-
unrelated, but otherwise vital, aspects of the underlying terrorism generation process.  
The above mentioned problems of existing data collection methods is indicative 
of the corrective measures needed, but also of the new avenues that could be followed. 
What becomes immediately apparent is that we need a more systematic, a wider and   15
more comprehensive data collection mechanism. In general what is needed is not a mere 
upgrade of collection methods, but in fact a change of its philosophy. This new 
philosophy should be based on two pillars. The first pillar would be to build on the 
undeniable heritage of terrorism event chronologies, by ensuring the exhaustiveness of 
collected data (event-wise) and the broadening of event-related attributes. Extending the 
fieldwork to include government agencies and NGOs seems necessary in order to succeed 
in this.  
The second pillar, and perhaps the most important, requires the disengagement of 
terrorism databases from events themselves. From a purely statistical point of view 
terrorist events are the mere realization of a more general stochastic process that 
generates them. There is only so much that can be said for this process from the study of 
the timing, the frequency and the attributes of terrorist events. Policy making, academic 
discourse and policy design, would be greatly benefited if databases focused on more 
general and enduring issues, what one would call the fundamentals of terrorism 
process. As I implied in previous sections these fundamentals, go beyond the terrorist 
events per se, require a systematic and extensive information gathering on the behavior, 
actions, attitudes and perceptions of the agents involved. This brings at centre stage the 
collection of data for (i) counterterrorism’s overall conduct, (ii) private security, (iii) 
terrorist groups’ conduct and (iv) individuals’ and firms’ terrorism risk perception and 
welfare effects.   
4.1  Counterterrorism: pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects  
 An apparent gap is the almost total absence of data regarding counterterrorism, 
which is one of the major co-determinants of terrorist activity and its consequences. The   16
lack of data has severely restricted academic output, which amounts to only a handful of 
academic studies (for a review and a recent application see Drakos and Giannakopoulos, 
2009).   
Data on counterterrorism expenditures would be instrumental for measuring its 
effectiveness and also for performing cost-benefit analysis. With regard to 
counterterrorism effectiveness, one could measure whether anti-terrorism expenditures do 
result in lower terrorist activity intertemporally and / or cross-nationally. Moreover, these 
expenditures could be used to compare them with the direct and indirect costs of 
terrorism activity. Furthermore, knowledge of the exact nature of counterterrorism 
expenditures could allow a horizontal comparison (i.e across types) in order to improve 
the efficiency of spending by identifying potential re-direction of funds. Data on 
counterterrorism expenditures could be obtained from national (and / or local 
government) budgets although one expects that there will be substantial comparability, 
and possibly confidentiality, issues.       
Apart from expenditures, other non-pecuniary aspects of authorities conduct, such 
as terrorism-related arrests, indictments and sentences would also assist us towards 
obtaining a more complete picture of counterterrorism. All datasets on terrorism actually 
correspond to instances that a terrorist act was initiated. Hence these datasets suffer from 
a rather peculiar selection bias, since the researcher is not offered information either for 
the number of terrorist attacks that were dissuaded or prevented by counterterrorism. 
Thus, information about the discouragement-disruption-interception of (planned) terrorist 
activities would enhance our knowledge of counterterrorism conduct.    17
4.2  Private sector security: demand and supply side  
It is obvious that the authorities’ counterterrorism expenditures provide an 
underestimate of society’s incurred security costs. In order to have a complete picture we 
need to take into account (i) the private sector’s (households and firms) security 
expenditures and (ii) the private sector’s insurance payments. These data would 
complement the direct costs of terrorism activity and terrorism risk, and thereby provide 
important elements needed to conduct cost-benefit analysis. Information can be obtained 
from standard micro-level surveys such as the Eurobarometer and the National Statistical 
Agencies.     
In addition, useful information can be obtained by acquiring data from the 
insurance market’s supply side, with regards to terrorism insurance coverage, risk premia, 
and insurance policies. Such data would be useful to assess the depth (or thinness) of the 
particular industry and the subsequent (in-) ability to hedge against terrorism risk. 
Moreover, policy makers could spot potential market failures and / or imperfections that 
would call for a government intervention (for instance in the form of new regulation, 
subsidization etc). These data could be collected by National Statistical Agencies that 
routinely survey the insurance industry.  
4.3  Terrorist groups’ conduct  
A limited -and of poor quality- information is available with regard to terrorist 
groups. In particular, research on terrorism has so far exhibited very low progress on 
modeling various aspects of the actual perpetrators. Issues that remain unresolved to a 
large extent due to data unavailability are group demographics, linkages, scope of 
operation and methods of financing and recruitment. Regarding group demographics, 
very little is known as to the causes that terrorist groups emerge and / or seize operation.   18
No terrorism database as such provides any information about how many terrorist groups 
are in operation worldwide, and as it turns out there is not even an objective indicator that 
could classify groups across different regimes (for instance: active, non-active, dormant). 
Similarly one gets very vague information for group linkages, for instance in the form of 
synergies at various levels (recruitment, operational, financing etc). Another important 
set of information that would greatly augment security research is the financing of 
terrorism organizations, and also further issues such as the potential links between 
organized crime and the financing of terrorism (see Schneider 2002, 2004; Bovenkerk 
and Chakra 2004; Napoleoni 2004; Ward 2004). The unavailability of data concerning 
the scope of operation of terrorist groups is another grey area that acts as an impediment 
to research. There is no formal coding of terrorist groups geographical scope of operation 
or their logistical capabilities, including recruitment, access to weapons and sources of 
financing. Hence, this lack of data creates difficulties in risk analysis and threat 
assessment.  Information on arrests, indictments, sentences and on some terrorist group 
characteristics is currently collected by EUROPOL. However, this information could be 
useful provided that it is extended to cover the dimensions discussed above and also if 
access to micro level data was granted.  
4.4 Terrorism  risk:  perception and welfare effects   
Past research has largely ignored the psychological effects of terrorism activity 
and the related terrorism risk perception, which may have substantial adverse effects. For 
instance, via its effects on agents’ decision making, it may lead to suboptimal choices that 
otherwise would not be made (Elster 1998; Hermalin and Isen 2003). Moreover, there be 
large welfare effects by the corresponding disutility they cause to agents (Frey et al.   19
2007). Thus, micro-level (individuals, firms) data on the social (including psychological 
and happiness effects) impact of terrorism, and also on risk perception would improve 
our ability to understand and design policies to deal with this complex social 
phenomenon. Furthermore, we have no information whatsoever regarding individuals’ 
willingness to tolerate increased security costs, either in the form of direct pecuniary 
payments or in the form of a trade-off between security and various civil liberties. This 
kind of data could be relatively easy to collect through the standard collection mechanism 
of the Eurobarometer.   
5. Conclusions 
The rapid and accelerating development of security economics has generated 
great demand for more and better data to accommodate the empirical research agenda. 
The present paper serves as a guide to policy makers and active researchers for security-
related databases’ availability and furthermore discuses data needs. The paper focuses on 
two main issues. Firstly, it takes stock of the existing databases highlighting their main 
components and also performs a brief statistical comparison. Secondly, it discusses data 
shortages and sketches data needs as well as the collection mechanisms of security-
related data. 
The main conclusions derived from the analysis are that terrorism chronologies, 
although of unquestionable value, fail to cover several important dimensions of the 
terrorism fundamentals, and therefore must be complemented by other databases. In 
particular, a change of philosophy is required in order to produce these new databases 
that will provide hard data for terrorist groups’ behavior, counterterrorism activity and 
micro level perceptions and responses to terrorism.             20
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Tables  
 
Table 1. Main variables appearing in databases  
  ITERATE TWEED GTD1  GTD2 
Incident Characteristics 
Date of start of incident  √  √  √  √ 
Country  √  √  √  √ 
Scene of incident  √    √  √ 
Evidence of state 
sponsorship 
√    √  √ 
Type of state sponsorship  √       
Type of incident  √  √  √  √ 
Total number of 
nationalities involved in 
incident 
√       
Responsibility Claim        √ 
Mode of claim        √ 
Confirmed claims        √ 
Additional claims        √ 
Competing claims        √ 
Terrorist Characteristics 
First / second /third 
group initiating action 
√  √  √  √ 
Number of terrorist 
groups directly involved 
√      √ 
Number of terrorists in 
attack force 
√      √ 
Number of female 
terrorists in attack force 
√      √ 
Number of nationalities 
of terrorists in attack 
force 
√       
First / second / third 
nationality of terrorists in 
attack force 
√       
Recidivists in attack 
force 
√       
Group’s ideological 
character 
  √  √  √ 
Victim Characteristics 
Number of victims  √  √  √  √ 
Number of nationalities 
of victims 
√       
First / second / third 
victim's nationality 
√    √  √ 
Number of United States 
victims 
√      √ 
Type of United States 
victim 
√       
Type of immediate 
victim 
√  √    √ 
Nature of victim entities  √      √ 
Life and Property Losses 
Total individuals 
wounded 
√  √  √  √ 
Terrorists wounded  √    √  √   24
Foreign wounded  √       
United States wounded  √      √ 
Government officials 
wounded 
√       
Total number of 
individuals killed 
√  √  √  √ 
Terrorists killed  √    √  √ 
Foreign killed  √       
United States killed  √      √ 
Government officials 
killed 
√       
Property  damages  √    √  √ 
Extend (amount of 
damage) 
√     √ 
Type of weapon used  √  √  √  √ 
Terrorist logistical 
success: stopped by 
authorities 
√       
Terrorist logistical 
outcome: success 
√    √  √ 
Terrorist logistical 
outcome: failure 
√    √  √ 
Psychosocial 
Consequences 
     √ 
State action: Arrests    √     
State action: Convictions    √     





Table 2. Regression of Total terrorist attacks on linear time trend 













R-squared  22.65% 38.77% 
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Table 3. Total Terrorist Attacks by country ( 1970-2004) 
Country  TWEED + ITERATE  GTD  Ratio (%),  
GTD to ITERATE-TWEED 
Austria  115 93  80.87 
Belgium  192 128  66.67 
Denmark  40 42  105.00 
France  3570 1817  50.90 
Germany  1159 617  53.24 
Greece  689 731  106.10 
Ireland  163 126  77.30 
Italy  584 1466  251.03 
Luxemburg  6 15  250.00 
Netherlands  211 109  51.66 
Norway  20 14  70.00 
Portugal  300 123  41.00 
Spain  1390 2872  206.62 
Sweden  63 48  76.19 




Table 4. Regression of TWEED + ITERATE on GTD 
 Pooled  (OLS)  Fixed-Effects  Random-Effects 



















R-squared (overall)  20 %  20 % 
R-squared (within)  - 5.68  % 
R-squared (between)  - 76.52  % 
Notes: One, two, three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level respectively.     26
 
Table 5.  Variety of quantitative data appearing in Europol’s Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report (TESAT) 
Data for  Appearing in 
Number of failed, foiled and successfully 
executed attacks and number of arrests 
TESAT 2008, TESAT 2007 
Number of arrested suspects per member state and 
affiliation 
TESAT 2008, TESAT 2007 
Number of individuals tried for terrorism charges 
per member state 
TESAT 2008, TESAT 2007 
Number of verdicts for terrorism charges per 
member state and affiliation 
TESAT 2008 
Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per 
member state 
TESAT 2008, TESAT 2007 
Average penalty per convicted individual per 
member state 
TESAT 2008, TESAT 2007 
Percentage of arrested suspects for Islamist 
terrorism per offence (Membership Terrorist 
Organization, Facilitation, Attack Related 
Offences, Financing, Recruitment, Propaganda, 
Training) 
TESAT 2008 
Terrorist Activity per Age Group (activity: 
Recruitment, Preparation, Attack, Attack 
Facilitation, Financing, False Documents, age 
groups: 18-29, 30-41) 
TESAT 2007   27
 
Table 6. Variety of questions appearing in Eurobarometer questionnaires   
Question
a,b  Appearing in 
Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with that 
“enlargement will help to fight against terrorism” 
EB 56.3 (Jan.-Feb. 2002) 
 
Do you think action taken by the European Union is, or 
would be very effective, fairly effective, not very effective, 
or not at all effective in “Fighting organized crime and drug 
trafficking” 
EB 56.3 (Jan.-Feb. 2002), EB 58.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2002), 
EB 60.1   (Oct.-Nov.  2003) 
 
Out of a list of actions that the European Union could 
undertake in your opinion, should be a priority, or not? 
“Fighting organized crime and drug trafficking” 
 
EB 56.3 (Jan.-Feb. 2002), EB 57.1 (Mar.-May 2002), 
EB 58.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2002), EB 58.2 (Oct.-Dec. 2002), 
EB 60.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2003), EB 62.0 (Oct.-Nov. 2004), 
EB 63.4 (May-June 2005), EB 64.2 (Oct.-Nov. 2005), 
EB 65.2  (Mar.-May 2006), EB 65.4 (June-Jul. 2006), 
EB 66.1 (Sep.-Oct. 2006), CCEB (2002.2), CCEB
c 
(2003.1)
*    
What do you think are the two most important issues facing 
(our) country at the moment?  “Crime, Terrorism”  
 
EB 57.0 (Feb.-Apr. 2002), EB 58.2 (Oct.-Dec. 2002), 
EB 60.1  (Oct.-Nov. 2003), EB 61.0 (Feb.-Mar. 2004), 
EB 62.0 (Oct.-Nov. 2004), EB 63.4 (May-June 2005), 
EB 64.2 (Oct.-Nov. 2005), EB 65.2 (Mar.-May 2006), 
EB 65.3 (May-June 2006), EB 66.1 (Sep.-Oct. 2006), 
EB 66.3 (Nov.-Dec. 2006), EB 67.2 (May-Apr. 2007), 
CCEB (2004.1).  
Here is a list of things that some people say they are afraid 
of. For each of these, please tell me if, personally you are 
afraid of it, or not? “Terrorism, Organized Crime” 
EB 57.1 (Mar.-May 2002), EB 58.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2002),  
EB  58.2  (Oct.-Dec. 2002) 
For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions 
should be made by the (Nationality) Government, or made 
jointly with the European Union? “the fight against 
organized crime, the fight against international terrorism” 
EB 57.1 (Mar.-May 2002), EB 58.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2002), 
EB 58.2 (Oct.-Dec. 2002), EB 60.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2003), 
EB 62.0 (Oct.-Nov. 2004), EB 64.2 (Oct.-Nov. 2005), 
EB 65.1 (Feb.-Mar. 2006), EB 65.4 (Jun.-Jul. 2006), 





I am going to read out a number of statements related to 
crime and crime prevention. For each one can you tell me 
whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree? “Organized 
crime has infiltrated the economy” 
EB 58.0 (Sep.-Oct. 2002) 
How much concern do you feel about each of the following 
problems? “Terrorism, Organized crime” 
EB 59.2 (May-June 2003) 
Could you tell me whether coordinated action at European 
Union level is very desirable, fairly desirable, not very 
desirable, not at all desirable? “Terrorism, Organized crime” 
EB 59.2 (May-June 2003) 
For each of the following issues (in our Country), do you 
think the European Union plays a positive role, a negative 
role, or neither positive nor negative role? “Fighting crime, 
Fighting terrorism” 
EB 60.1 (Oct.-Nov. 2003), EB 61.0 (Feb.-Mar. 2004), 
EB 62.0 (Oct.-Nov. 2004), EB 63.4 (May-June 2005), 
EB 65.2 (Mar.-May 2006), CCEB (2004.1). 
I will read you a list of potential risks. For each of them tell 
me how likely you think there are to happen to you 
personally? “Being the victim of crime, Being the victim of 
terrorism” 
EB 64.1 (Sep.-Oct. 2005) 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10 how would you judge the 
performance of the European Union in each of the following 
areas (1 means “not at all satisfactory”, 10 means “very 
satisfactory”) “The fight against crime, the fight against 
terrorism” 
EB 65.1 (Feb.-Mar. 2006) 
Notes: (a) the exact phrasing of questions has been adapted by the author, (b) “” indicates potential answers, (c) CCEB 
stands for Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, * denotes that terrorism was not among the potential answers.       28
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Notes: GTD does not provide data for 1993.  
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Notes: GTD does not provide data for 1993.  
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Notes: Correlation for 1993 not calculated due to missing data from GTD.  